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Non-technical summary 
Regarding social needs in Germany long-term care is an important issue due to an ageing 
population. Shrinking social networks are leading to a greater need for a public long-term care 
system. In 1995 the social long-term care insurance was introduced in Germany which is 
similar in nature to the other social insurances, such as the health care or pension insurance. 
Long-term care insurance funds are generally linked to health insurance funds. The benefits 
are financed by virtue of an income-based system where all employees covered by the social 
security system and their employers have to pay equal contributions on a pay-as-you-go basis.  
In case of long-term care needs a frail person is assigned to one of three care levels according 
to his/her severity of need. Benefit recipients living in private households can choose between 
three kinds of transfers: in-kind transfers, lump-sum transfers and combined transfers whereas 
the amount of in-kind transfers is higher than the lump-sum transfers in all care levels. Benefit 
recipients living in nursing homes receive the highest amount of transfers.  
In recent years some drawbacks of the social long-term care insurance structure turned out to 
be in need of reform: While health insurance is a fully comprehensive system, long-term care 
insurance only provides limited cover. Therefore, insurance funds have an incentive to shift 
some services from health care to long-term care insurance. For instance, there is a low 
incentive to provide rehabilitation measures in order to lower the care level. Additionally, 
there is no free competition on the long-term care market because care packages included in 
the in-kind transfers are negotiated (with respect to services and prices) between insurance 
funds and professional care providers. Finally, the financial situation of the German social 
long-term care insurance is tight. While in the first years after introduction the net results of 
revenues and expenditures were positive they have been negative since 1999 which is due to 
an increasing number of benefit recipients. 
Therefore, we discuss several reform options which have been proposed in order to overcome 
the financial and structural problems. Suggestions for the income side include the introduction 
of fixed premiums, a fully funded system, a private insurance, or a citizens’ insurance. The 
main problem here is to finance the transition from one system to another system. Some 
proposals are discussed here. The introduction of individual budgets is the most popular 
option for the outcome side. A social experiment is under way in order to evaluate the impact 
of so-called matching transfers. 
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11 Introduction 
In recent years there has been a growing output of literature on long-term care - not only in 
the economic sciences, but also in the fields of sociology, psychology and medicine. Although 
all developed countries face similar issues relating to long-term care, most of the literature in 
Germany has been restricted to a single-country discussion. However, in order to reflect on a 
long-term care system and to implement reforms in the existing system it is very helpful to 
examine experiences in other countries. The need for information about country-specific 
systems and current developments became apparent at an international conference on long-
term care held at ZEW in October 2005. Although several international comparisons of the 
way in which long-term care is financed and organized in European or OECD countries 
(Holdenrieder 2003, OECD 1996, OECD 2005) are available, we are not aware of any papers 
written in English which deal in detail with current developments and reform options for the 
long-term care system in Germany. It is our intention that this paper should fill this gap. 
Why is there so much interest in long-term care (LTC) in developed countries? The answer to 
this question is that low birth rates, restrictive immigration quotas and increased life 
expectancy are all causing the population to age. With a current fertility rate (Fertilitätsrate) of 
about 1.4 (which is predicted to be constant) and a decreasing immigration quota 
(Immigrationsquote) the German population will shrink consistently in the decades ahead. 
The population statistics of the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) also 
predict that the life expectancy of 60-year-old men (women) will increase from 19.2 (23.5) in 
2000 to at least 22.0 (27.7) in 2050.1 In 2040 the so-called baby boomer generation (cohorts 
born in the early 1960s, when birth rates were extremely high in Germany) will be about 80 
years. As a result the fraction of the population composed of people aged 60 plus (24.1 per 
cent in 2001) will increase to 36.7 per cent in 2050. The share of people aged 80 and older 
(3.9 per cent in 2001) will increase to 12.1 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003). 
Furthermore, the risk of needing care increases dramatically for the over-80s - rising from 3.9 
per cent in the 60 to 80 age group to 31.8 per cent in the 80 plus group (Bundesministerium 
für Gesundheit 2006a). The number of frail elderly is therefore expected to rise enormously.  
There will also be greater need for professional long-term care in the future as lower birth 
rates mean there will be fewer people available to care for their frail elderly parents, social 
networks will be eroded and more women will be in gainful employment. At present around 
80 per cent of all frail elderly people are looked after by at least one family member (so-called 
                                                 
1 We show the life expectancy calculated by variant 1 which is the most conservative estimate of three different 
variants.  
2informal care providers (informell Pflegende)). Moreover, in 55 per cent of all households 
with a frail elderly person informal care is the only form of care available (Schneekloth and 
Leven 2003). Obviously, a decreasing supply of informal care (Pflege durch Angehörige) will 
have to be substituted by care providers (Pflegedienste) which will entail a substantial 
increase in costs. Depending on the type of long-term care system this will have to be paid for 
by higher contributions to an LTC insurance scheme, higher taxes, or higher out-of-pocket 
payments (Zuzahlungen der Versicherten). How to finance rising costs and how to guarantee 
LTC services of acceptable quality are the main issues being addressed in the German 
discussion on long-term care. 
Chapter 2 describes the German social long-term care insurance system (soziale 
Pflegeversicherung). Chapter 3 gives an overview of public assistance. Apart from health 
insurance this was the only benefit available to frail elderly people who were unable to afford 
long-term care services on their own prior to the introduction of long term care social 
insurance. Chapter 4 discusses several reform options and Chapter 5 concludes.  
2 German social long-term care insurance 
A long-term care insurance scheme, similar in nature to other social insurance systems in 
Germany (pension, employment and health insurance), was introduced by the German 
Parliament in 1994.2 All employees earning less than the social security earnings ceiling 
(Pflichtversicherungsgrenze) for the German social insurance system (3,937.50 euros per 
month in 2006) are members of this system. Contributions are paid equally by employers and 
employees and are calculated from gross income up to a social security contribution ceiling 
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) which is fixed every year. Employees who are not covered by 
the social insurance system (i.e. civil-servants, self-employed etc.) are usually members of a 
private health and pension insurance.   
All members of the social health insurance scheme are automatically covered by social long-
term care insurance. The responsible long-term care insurance funds (Pflegekassen) are 
affiliated to the corresponding health insurance funds (Krankenkassen). Employees who are 
not covered by social LTC insurance are permitted to contract with a private long-term care 
insurance institution as long as they are members of a private health insurance scheme. 
Around 90 per cent of the German population is consequently covered by the social LTC 
insurance scheme and around 9 per cent have private LTC insurance cover. 
                                                 
2 There is also an industrial accident insurance for which contributions have to be paid by the employer for all 
employees regardless of their gross income. 
32.1 Institutions 
The federal states are responsible for ensuring that an efficient and cost-effective long-term 
care infrastructure is provided, for guaranteeing that the scale of services on offer is adequate, 
and for the quality and efficiency of LTC institutions. It is the task of the authorities (the 
Federal Government, governments of the states, local authorities) to avoid disparities in 
support and to ensure a regular supply of long-term care in every region in Germany. This 
includes assuming the investment costs of all local, state-owned, and non-profit-making care 
institutions and private maintenance. 
The remit of the long-term care insurance funds is to ensure the supply of permanent care for 
their insured and to eliminate shortcomings in quality. They consequently control the quality 
of the care supplied. Nevertheless, their ability to ensure the supply of care is limited by the 
fact that they have no appropriate influence on the creation, promotion or maintenance of an 
LTC infrastructure. This task is assigned to the states. Furthermore, the LTC transfers are paid 
by the insurance funds. Together with the Medical Review Board of the Statutory Health 
Insurance Funds (Medizinische Dienste der Krankenkassen MDK) they assign the appropriate 
level of care assistance to the person in need, and bargain for the price of the care assistance 
with care providers. They also offer LTC courses to voluntary care-giving staff to make home 
care easier and more efficient. LTC insurance funds are thus responsible for guaranteeing 
nursing quality on the one hand, and paying and bargaining for the costs on the other. The 
combination of these functions (increasing the quality of nursing vs. decreasing costs) may be 
a source of conflicts.  
Long-term care providers are supported either locally, by the federal states, or by non-profit 
or private organisations. A supply contract (Versorgungsvertrag) is concluded between these 
institutions and the insurance funds. This contract is essential for ongoing home care or 
nursing home care in that it qualifies this form of support for the recognised LTC market. The 
supply contract regulates the type, contents, and extent of the general nursing benefits which a 
care institution must provide. It also defines the so-called care package (Leistungskomplexe). 
Nursing institutions must guarantee humane, dignified, and stimulating care, and must respect 
human rights. Frail elderly people must be nursed, looked after, and comforted; terminal care 
(Sterbebegleitung) must also be provided where applicable. Qualifying nursing institutions 
must contribute to quality assurance procedures.   
2.2 Financing 
LTC insurance is similar to other German social insurance schemes in that it is financed by 
contributions based on gross income which are shared equally by employers and employees in 
4a pay-as-you-go system.3 Children and non-employed married partners can be co-insured 
without paying extra contributions. The contributions are calculated as a share of gross 
income up to a contribution ceiling of 3,562,50 euros (in 2006). This means of course that 
people on higher incomes contribute more to the social insurance scheme in accordance with 
the solidarity principle. Between January 1, 1994, and April 1, 1995 the contribution rate was 
1 per cent. During this time no transfers were paid through the LTC insurance. The 
contribution rate since April 1, 1995 has been 1.7 per cent.4 Benefits for home care were 
granted from April 1, 1995 onwards, whereas those for nursing home care entered into effect 
on July 1, 1996. In line with a verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) from 2001, which stated that it was unconstitutional for long-
term care insurance members with children to pay the same level of contributions as childless 
members, the federal government drafted a “children-consideration law” 
(Kinderberücksichtigungsgesetz) which increased the contribution rate for childless people 
aged 22 and older by 0.25 percentage points on January 1, 2005.  
Table 1: Financial situation of the social long-term care insurance (in Billion euros) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Revenues 8.41 12.04 15.94 16.00 16.32 16.55 16.81 16.98 16.86 16.87 17.49
Expenditures 4.97 10.86 15.14 15.88 16.35 16.67 16.87 17.36 17.56 17.69 17.86
Net result 3.44 1.18 0.80 0.13 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.38 -0.69 -0.82 -0.36 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung (2006b) 
In the first few years following its introduction revenues exceeded expenditures and a 
considerable balance could consequently be built up. However, since 1999 the scheme has 
ceased to be fully funded and its reserves have been reduced from year to year (see Table 1). 
In the long run sustainable financial insurance cannot therefore be guaranteed. The costs of 
maintaining present standards of care would require an increase in the premium rate up to at 
least 3.2 per cent by 2040 (Häcker et al. 2004). Alternatively, the level of care will have to be 
lowered in order to adjust the imbalance between revenues and expenses. 
There are about 250 long-term care insurance funds in Germany. While these funds are 
affiliated to the health insurance funds they differ as regards their financial structure in three 
main ways. Firstly, while health insurance is a fully comprehensive insurance system which 
                                                 
3 Since April 1, 2004 pensioners have been required to pay the contributions entirely from their own pockets and 
no longer receive a contribution subsidy from the pension funds. 
4 The employer’s contribution was financed by abolishing Germany's Penance Day public holiday, except in 
Saxony where the scheme is funded by employers and employees paying 1.35 per cent (0.675 per cent) instead 
of 0.85 per cent. 
5covers all necessary health services, LTC insurance only provides limited insurance cover. 
This means that services which could potentially fall within the remit of both insurance 
schemes tend to be shifted to the LTC insurance because this is much cheaper. Secondly, 
although the revenues and costs of all the German health funds are equalized to take account 
of their respective member structures (age, gender) (Strukturausgleich), this is not the case for 
the revenues and costs of the LTC funds. This leads to a high disincentive for the LTC funds 
to minimize their costs. Thirdly, the health insurance funds are in competition with each other 
as far as their contribution rates are concerned, i.e. they have an incentive to lower their 
expenditures for services and administration. With respect to a fixed contribution rate this is 
not the case for the LTC funds and thus there is no incentive to produce long-term care 
efficiently. All this leads to a shift from services which should be paid by the health insurance 
to the LTC insurance (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Entwicklung im 
Gesundheitswesen 2006, 559ff). 
2.3 Benefit Recipients 
In order to claim benefits from the compulsory long-term care insurance scheme an insured 
person must be defined as "frail". The Social Security Code (SGB, Sozialgesetzbuch) XI 
defines a frail person as “a person who requires for a minimum period of approximately six 
months, permanent, frequent or extensive help in performing a special number of ‘Activities 
of Daily Life’ (ADL, grundlegende Aktivitäten des täglichen Lebens) and ‘Instrumental 
Activities of Daily Life’ (IADL, instrumentelle Aktivitäten des täglichen Lebens)5 due to 
physical, mental or psychological illness or disability” (Holdenrieder 2003). Such a person is 
dependent on assistance with personal care, nutrition, mobility and housekeeping.  
The verification of care needs is the responsibility of the long-term care insurance funds. The 
funds entrust the task of identifying, verifying and assessing the severity of care needs to the 
Medical Review Board of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds, which is primarily made up 
of doctors and nurses. The assessment takes place in the home of the insured person provided 
they give their consent. If such an assessment is not performed the insurance funds are 
entitled to refuse to pay benefits.  
The Medical Review Boards examine the care needs on the basis of the following categories: 
Body care (Körperpflege): washing, showering, bathing, dental care, combing (Kämmen), 
shaving, micturition (Blasenentleerung) and defecation (Darmentleerung) 
                                                 
5 ADL refers to activities such as combing and dressing, whereas IADL comprises more complex procedures like 
preparing meals or banking transactions. 
6Nutrition (Ernährung): assistance with ingestion (Nahrungsaufnahme) and preparation of 
bite-sized meals 
Mobility (Mobilität): getting up and going to bed, dressing and undressing, walking, standing 
and climbing stairs at home, assistance with leaving and entering the accommodation for the 
purpose of maintaining the person's lifestyle (e.g. for consultation) 
Household help (hauswirtschaftliche Versorgung)): shopping, cooking, washing up, cleaning 
and changing of clothing as well as tidying up and heating the accommodation. 
These guidelines, which only relate to physical impairment, take no account of the special 
needs of people with learning disabilities or people suffering from dementia (Demenz). After 
their care needs have been evaluated, the persons requiring care are assigned to one of the 
three care levels shown in Table 2. Table 3 shows the number of benefit recipients and their 
assignment to the different care levels. The figures clearly show that the share of frail elderly 
in nursing homes has increased continuously since 1996. 
Table 2: Care levels and care needs 
 Care level I 
- need for 
considerable care 
Care level II 
- need for intensive 
care 
Care level III 
- need for highly 
intensive care 
Help with personal 
care, nutrition or 
mobility 
at least once a day for 
at least two tasks in 
one or more areas 
at least three times a 
day at different times 
of the day 
assistance around the 
clock 
Additional assistance several times a week 
in taking care of the 
household 
several times a week 
in taking care of the 
household 
several times per week 
in taking care of the 
household 
Nursing staff needs at least 1.5 hours/day 
on the average 
at least 3 hours/day on 
the average 
at least 5 hours/day on 
the average 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7Table 3: Social long-term care insurance benefit recipients at the end of 1996, 2000 and 
2005 
  Care level I Care level II Care level III Sum 
Home care 
508,462 
(43.8) 
507,329 
(43.7) 
146,393 
(12.6) 
1,162,184 
(75.1) 
1996 
Nursing 
home care 
111,856 
(29.1) 
162,818 
(42.3) 
109,888 
(28.6) 
384,562 
(28.9) 
Home care 
681,658 
(54.1) 
448,406 
(35.6) 
130,696 
(10.4) 
1,260,760 
(69.2) 
2000 
Nursing 
home care 
210,883 
(37.6) 
234,836 
(41.8) 
115,625 
(20.6) 
561,344 
(30.8) 
Home care 
759,114 
(58.0) 
425,843 
(32.5) 
124,549 
(9.5) 
1,309,506 
(67.0) 
2005 
Nursing 
home care 
251,730 
(39.2) 
262,528 
(40.9) 
128,189 
(19.9) 
642,477 
(33.0) 
Note:  Per cent in parentheses.  
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und soziale Sicherung (2004), Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 
und soziale Sicherung (2006a). 
Once a frail person is assigned to a care level, only the affected person, their relatives, the 
institution in which the person lives or the LTC insurance fund can ask for a new examination 
by the Medical Review Board. Benefit recipients are not examined on a regular basis but the 
Medical Review Board can recommend the next date for an examination to the insurance fund 
in the former report (Medizinischer Dienst, 2006). The Medical Review Board must also 
check the options for rehabilitation measures (Rehabilitationsmaßnahmen) available. 
Rehabilitation advice is not given to the person in need of care or their physician but to the 
insurance fund. Rehabilitation measures must be paid by the health insurance funds which are 
interested in shifting costs to the LTC insurance scheme (see above). This leads to a 
disincentive to finance rehabilitation measures and the fund therefore prefers to pay higher 
LTC transfers (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen 
2003, 644; 2006, 573ff). This implies that persons could stay in a higher care level even if 
their condition improved. On the other hand, the frail person him/herself or his/her family will 
only apply for a new examination if they see a chance of being assigned to a higher care level. 
Summing up, there are high disincentives to assigning a frail person to a lower care level. 
There were only 530,000 repeated examinations in 2004 accounting for 27.5 per cent of all 
benefit recipients at the end of the year (Medizinischer Dienst 2006). The percentage of cases 
which are assigned to a higher, the same, or a lower level following repeated examination is 
shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Benefit recipients according to care level (in per cent) for 2004 
 Home care Nursing home care 
 Same level Lower level Higher level Same level Lower level Higher level 
Level I 46.0 8.2 45.8 29.2 2.2 68.6 
Level II 54.8 11.1 34.1 43.5 4.3 52.3 
Level III 82.2 17.8 - 75.0 25.0 - 
Source: Medizinischer Dienst (2006). 
2.4 Transfers 
The kind of transfers granted depends on the severity of the frailty (care level) and the type of 
care arrangements chosen (by family members, care providers or in a nursing home). Persons 
requiring home care can thus either draw lump-sum transfers (Geldleistung), in-kind transfers 
(Sachleistung), or a combination of both. Only lump-sum transfers can be claimed for nursing 
home care. German legislation assigns priority to home care over nursing home care and the 
LTC insurance is expected to continue supporting patients being cared for at home for as long 
as possible. This means that the Medical Review Board must assess the need for a frail elderly 
person to live in a nursing home. If the Board believes such care is not necessary, the insured 
person only receives the benefits due for home care. 
2.4.1 Transfers for home care 
In-kind transfers  
Home care is provided by professional staff (care providers) with whom the LTC insurance 
funds conclude a supply contract. It consists of assistance in the areas of basic care (personal 
hygiene, food, mobility) and household help. The scale of transfers depends on the level of 
need. People who need considerable care (care level I) receive 384 euros per month, those in 
need of intensive care (care level II) 921 euros, and people in need of highly intensive care 
(care level III) 1,432 euros per month (see also Table 5). In cases of hardship, i.e. if someone 
requires extraordinary intensive care which exceeds the assistance reserved for care level III, 
such as at the end-stage of cancer when regular assistance is required several times during the 
night, the insurance funds may allow further benefits of up to 1,918 euros per month. The 
person in need of care can request assistance according to his needs. For this reason, contracts 
are concluded with a care service. These differ from federal state to federal state and form a 
clear framework for the in-kind benefits. These packages contain a detailed list of the costs of 
9each service and are a means for discounting. As the contents of the package of services are 
mandatory, the assistance granted by the in-kind benefits is not very flexible.  
Lump-sum transfers 
Instead of in-kind transfers the frail elderly person can apply for lump-sum transfers, which in 
turn depend on the care level. People in care level I receive 205 euros, those in care level II 
410 euros, and people in care level III 665 euros per month (see Table 4). The lump-sum 
transfers include gratuities for relatives and are not dedicated, i.e. they can be used for any 
type of purchase. For this reason, in order to ensure the quality of home care and professional 
backup for domestic assistants, everyone receiving lump-sum transfers must request care 
advice from a professional care service. If this service is not requested, the payment of the 
transfers can either be interrupted or cancelled. As for care levels I and II, this service has to 
be called on at least once every six months, and at least quarterly for care level III.  
Combined transfers 
If the monthly claim for in-kind transfers is not used entirely, a certain percentage of the 
remaining amount is paid as a lump-sum transfer. The rate is calculated as the ratio of the 
maximum sum for the in-kind benefits and the actually drawn sum. The lump-sum transfer is 
granted according to this ratio under the condition that another person (e.g. relative or 
neighbour) takes over the remaining nursing needs not covered by the care provider. The frail 
elderly person is bound to the decision on the proportion of in-kind benefits and lump-sum 
benefits for six months.  
Additional benefits 
If the informal care provider is unable to provide the care (e.g. in case of illness or vacation), 
the long-term care insurance fund pays the costs of a respite caregiver. The frail elderly 
person thus does not have to move out of his home for that period of time. To be entitled to 
this form of benefit, the previous caregiver must have been caring for the frail elderly person 
in his home for at least twelve months. The insurance funds pay up to 1,432 euros of 
additional transfers for a maximum period of four weeks per calendar year. If the respite carer 
(Pflegevertretung) is provided by a non-professional person, only the lump-sum transfer based 
on the assessed care level will be paid. In addition, necessary and substantiated costs which 
have been incurred by the caregiver during the period of respite care will be remunerated (e.g. 
travelling expenses, earning losses) up to a maximum sum of 1,432 euros of the whole care 
costs. Instead of respite care in the domestic environment the frail elderly can make use of a 
10
suitable institution. For the refund of these care expenses (excluding accommodation and 
catering) the above mentioned maximum sum and time limitations apply analogously.  
In some cases while frail elderly people may be able to live in their own homes, it may not be 
possible to provide professional care due, for example, to the need for permanent night care. 
The person is then entitled to day/night care in a nursing home (teilstationäre Tages-
/Nachtpflege) respectively, including medical treatment, social care, and transportation costs. 
The maximum sum of 1,432 euros a month is charged against the other benefits. 
The insurance funds may accept the costs of short-term care (Kurzzeitpflege) if only partial or 
no home care at all is provided and day/night care is not sufficient, e.g. during a transition 
period after nursing home care or in the event of a severe intensification in the need for care. 
Short-term care is provided for in licensed nursing homes for up to four weeks per calendar 
year. The transfers for this care level do not exceed 1,432 euros. Entitlement to these benefits 
covers the costs of assistance-related expenditures, charges for medical treatment and social 
care. Accommodation, catering, and possible additional demands must be paid by the insured 
person.  
Home care is supplemented by providing auxiliary care products (e.g. disinfectants 
(Desinfektionsmittel), drawsheets (Unterlagen), etc.) and technical aid (e.g. sick-beds 
(Pflegebetten), wheelchairs (Rollstühle), etc.), making home care easier or allowing frail 
elderly people a more independent lifestyle. Up to 31 euros per month are provided for these 
supplementaries by the insurance funds. Technical aid is made available at no additional 
costs. Where this is not possible, the insured person (aged 18 or above) must contribute 10 per 
cent of the costs (not exceeding 25 euros).  
2.4.2 Transfers for nursing home care 
The frail elderly are entitled to care in fulltime nursing homes if domestic or day/night care is 
not possible or is out of question in special individual cases. The home-care transfers 
provided under the LTC insurance scheme again depend on the care level of the insured: 
1,023 euros for those in care level I, 1,279 euros, for care level II, 1,432 euros for care level 
III, and 1,668 euros for cases of hardship. There is thus a wide gap between the maximum 
amount of in-kind transfers and those for nursing home care, especially for care level I. The 
annual expenditure of the long-term care insurance funds may not exceed an average amount 
of 15,339 euros per frail elderly person This means that the benefit receipts for care level III 
and hardship cases may be capped at the end of a year. 
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Table 5: Benefit receipts for different care levels (in euros) 
Kind of assistance Level I Level II Level III Hardship case 
In-kind transfers /month 384 921 1,432 1,918 
Lump-sum transfers/month 205 410 665 - 
Respite care/year 1,432 1,432 1,432 - 
Day/Night care/month 384 921 1,432 - 
Short-term care/year 1,432 1,432 1,432 - 
Nursing home care/month 1,023 1,279 1,432 1,688 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und soziale Sicherung (2004). 
Table 6: Benefit recipients of different kinds of benefits on average in 2003 
In-kind transfers Lump-sum 
transfers 
Combined 
transfers 
Respite care Day/night care 
169,580 
(8.6) 
968,289 
(49.0) 
202,710 
(10.3) 
10,362 
(0.5) 
13,864 
(0.7) 
Short-term care Nursing home 
care 
Care in 
institutions for 
disabled persons 
Sum  
9,317 
(0.5) 
540,070 
(27.3) 
63,104 
(3.2) 
1,977,296 
(100) 
 
Note: Per cent in parentheses.  
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und soziale Sicherung (2004). 
2.5 Quality  
2.5.1 Legal regulations 
The long-term care insurance law (Pflegeversicherungsgesetz) requires all participating 
institutions and authorities to maintain basic levels of quality. They should develop common 
“principles and standards for the quality and quality assurance of nursing home and home care 
as well as for the development of quality management for nursing homes” (Grundsätze und 
Maßstäbe für die Qualität und Qualitätssicherung der ambulanten und stationären Pflege 
sowie für die Entwicklung einrichtungsinternen Qualitätsmanagements). These common 
principles should provide an evaluation scale for the quality of professional care providers. 
However, the quality assurance of informal care is not regulated by the common principles. 
While drawing lump-sum transfers only the designated professional services are subject to 
those principles. 
Furthermore, home care providers and nursing homes are subject to the control of the Medical 
Review Board on the order of the LTC insurance funds. In case of serious shortcomings the 
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contract between the care providers and the insurance funds can be cancelled. Nevertheless, 
the Medical Review Board is only able to expose serious shortcomings and cannot therefore 
guarantee comprehensive quality assurance (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen 2006, 538). In 2001, the long-term care insurance law was 
amended to include the requirement to fulfil performance and quality agreements reached 
between insurance funds and nursing homes. The federal government is now also empowered 
to order comparative surveys of all nursing homes in Germany. 
2.5.2 Quality assurance and competition 
One way of ensuring that specific standards of quality are achieved in long-term care is to 
establish a fully competitive market for LTC providers. This means that competition should 
create economic incentives for care providers to perform efficiently and provide good quality 
services. Open competition is restricted in Germany, however, by quasi-governmental control 
of the LTC insurance funds. The relationship between insurance funds, care providers and 
customers leads to asymmetric information which impedes open competition on the LTC 
market. Whether a product is traded on the market depends on whether it belongs to the care 
package and thus on the definition powers wielded by the insurance funds. Additionally, fixed 
prices for care packages mean that price-competition is out of question. The sovereignty of 
the care market’s consumers is also limited, as the availability and offer of the services is 
standardized in the care packages, providing the receivers with no influence in the negotiation 
process between insurance funds and care providers. 
2.5.3 Recent developments  
Quality assurance is one of the main objectives of the social long-term care insurance. 
However, the number of institutions, providers, consumers etc. involved in the LTC market 
makes quality-control of the care processes or even the introduction of quality management 
difficult. Although all of the participants in the market are likely to guarantee high-quality 
care, no general definition of this term is yet available. Nevertheless, the following three 
kinds of quality are generally discussed (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen 2002, 128ff): 
Quality of structure refers to the general framework of care, especially personal, 
regional and factual configuration of the entire care institution. 
Process quality refers to nursing and supply activities as well as accommodation. 
Process quality consists of the design, supervision, implementation and documentation 
of care benefits.  
13
Quality of results refers to comparisons of intended and actually achieved care results, 
taking account of the satisfaction and condition of the affected frail elderly people. 
The evaluation and improvement of the structural and process quality of long-term care is 
well established in German institutions, although mainly in connection with the efficient use 
of economic resources and the introduction of quality management (Sachverständigenrat zur 
Begutachtung der Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen 2002, 389 ff.). Some institutions use 
quality marks or certificates, others have adopted benchmark-oriented approaches or concepts 
of dynamic quality improvement (Igl et al. 2002). Nevertheless, a comprehensive comparison 
of institutions is not possible. Furthermore, the quality of results and thus the perspective of 
the consumers are more or less ruled out of the quality management of LTC institutions in 
Germany (Schönberg und Schnabel 2002).6  
3 Public Assistance 
Apart from the German social insurance system there is also the option of receiving means-
tested public assistance. "Current public assistance” (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt) benefits are 
available to cover general daily living expenses and “special public assistance” (Hilfe in 
besonderen Lebenslagen) can be claimed to cover special expenses which include, among 
other things, “special public LTC assistance” (Hilfe zur Pflege). Prior to the introduction of 
social long-term care insurance “special public LTC assistance” was the main financial 
resource for frail persons who could not afford comprehensive care services from their own 
means. Additionally, since 1988 the health insurance scheme has paid in-kind transfers of up 
to 750 DM (383 euros) (or 25 visits) per month for professional home care for people with 
serious handicaps, or up to 400 DM (205 euros) per month of lump-sum transfers for private 
caregivers. Home care of up to four weeks a year was subsidised with 1,800 DM (920 euros) 
to enable informal care providers to take a vacation and to pay for temporary professional 
respite provision (OECD 1996). Although costs for home care were partly covered by the 
health insurance scheme, nursing home care was not covered at all. However, costs in LTC 
institutions are high and often exceed the incomes of the frail elderly. Therefore, prior to the 
implementation of the German LTC insurance scheme, 69 (88) per cent of frail elderly 
persons living in nursing homes in western (eastern) Germany claimed public assistance 
transfers (Schneekloth and Müller 1999). This imposed a heavy burden on local authorities 
paying for public assistance. Additionally, many frail elderly persons felt stigmatised by their 
dependence on selective benefits intended for the poorest of society. Solutions to this problem 
                                                 
6 Several projects have attempted to evaluate the quality of nursing homes using the satisfaction of residents as 
one indicator (see Klie et al. 2002). 
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were the focus of discussion for several years prior to the introduction of the long-term care 
insurance scheme by the federal government. Indeed, the number of people receiving public 
assistance decreased after its introduction. The share of people on public assistance benefits in 
nursing homes, for example, decreased to 44 (29) per cent of all residents in western (eastern) 
Germany in 1998. However, there are still an enormous number of public assistance 
recipients especially among nursing home residents (see Table 7). Spending on “special 
public LTC assistance” (which is the highest for nursing home care) decreased from 9 billion 
euros in 1994 to 2.9 billion euros in 2000 (see Table 8). 
Table 7: Recipients “special public LTC assistance”  
 Home care Nursing home care Total* 
1994 189,254 268,382 453,613 
1995 85,092 288,199 372,828 
1996 66,387 219,136 285,340 
1997 64,396 186,672 250,911 
1998 62,202 160,238 222,231 
1999 56,616 190,868 247,333 
2000 58,797 202,734 261,405 
2001 60,514 195,531 255,883 
2002 59,801 186,591 246,212 
2003 55,405 186,867 242,066 
Note: * Excluding multiple counting if identifiable; The numbers were counted at the end of every year. 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und soziale Sicherung (2004), Bundesregierung (2005). 
Table 8: Spending on “special public LTC assistance” in thousand DM (euros) 
 Home care Nursing home care Sum 
1994 1,633,579 
(835,236) 
16,089,662 
(8,226,514) 
17,723,241 
(9,061,749) 
1995 1,068,302 
(546,214) 
16,404,842 
(8,387,663) 
17,473,144 
(8,933,877) 
2000 826,980 
(422,828) 
4,798,824 
(2,453,600) 
5,625,804 
(2,876,428) 
2004 (540,012) (2,601,883) (3,141,896) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994, 1995, 2000, 2004). 
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4 Reform options 
4.1 Main issues 
Several reasons for the financial problems encountered by social insurance schemes in 
Germany can be identified. Population ageing and the rising costs associated with an increase 
in the number of claimants clearly play a role. Additionally, the difficult labour market has 
eroded the system's income basis in recent years and there is no prospect of this situation 
improving in the near future. What is more, people on incomes above the contribution ceiling 
generally are not members of the social LTC insurance and do not therefore contribute to the 
redistribution system despite having a higher mean income than that of members of the social 
insurance schemes. Finally, the price of long-term care services have risen much faster than 
general consumer prices and average wages in recent years. This trend is expected to 
continue. Between 1995 and 2004 prices for health services at home increased 3.4 per cent per 
year on average. In the same period prices for institutional health services increased 5.9 per 
cent per year (Kronberger Kreis 2005).  
If the German long-term care insurance system is not reformed contribution rates will 
increase dramatically over the next 45 years. Kronberger Kreis (2005) and Häcker and 
Raffelhüschen (2004), for instance, anticipate a contribution rate of 5.9 per cent in 2050. The 
Herzog-Commission (2003) predicts a rate of 5.8 per cent. Only the Rürup Commission 
(2003) expects a lower contribution rate of 3.0 per cent in 2040. Nevertheless, increasing the 
contribution rate is a very unpopular means of solving financial problems. Non-labour wage 
costs (Lohnnebenkosten) are already high in Germany and are one of the reasons for the 
country's high rate of unemployment. Therefore, other reform options are widely discussed in 
academia and politics. However, a distinction must be made between the income and output 
sides of the system. The former is discussed first. Several proposals for reform have been 
mapped with the objective of counteracting the increasing financial problems of the social 
insurance system. Four different instruments are proposed which can be partially mixed. They 
all contrast the status quo:  
- Fixed premiums vs. income-related contributions (status quo) 
- Fully-funded vs. pay-as-you-go system (status quo) 
- Private insurance vs. social and private insurance (status quo) 
- Citizens insurance vs. social and private insurance (status quo)  
In addition to the problems on the income side, spending is also expected to rise sharply. The 
benefit package on the output side must therefore be adjusted. On the one hand, nursing home 
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care will play a greater role owing to changing family structures and because nursing home 
care transfers cost a great deal more than home care transfers. This leads to cost pressure. 
Incentives must therefore be changed to make home care more attractive. On the other hand, 
while LTC receipts have not changed since the introduction of the LTC insurance scheme, the 
prices for care services have increased substantially. Furthermore, there is a huge need for 
care for dementia patients which is seldom covered by LTC insurance. Therefore, an 
extension and adjustment of benefit receipts should be part of a reform of the whole system. 
Reform options on the outcome side - which are demanded by almost all authors dealing with 
the social long-term care insurance system - relate to changes in the composition of transfers 
(matching transfer) to provide an incentive for long-term home care. Furthermore, an 
extension of the benefit package and a regular adjustment of the benefit receipts are 
demanded. 
4.2 Income side options 
Fixed Premiums 
In Germany there is a huge debate about whether to keep social insurance contributions linked 
to incomes or to introduce fixed premiums, at least for social health and social long-term care 
insurance. Supporters of the fixed premium model argue that premiums should be completely 
independent of wages and that the tax system should be responsible for redistribution. 
Premiums should therefore be calculated dependent on entrance age but independent of sex 
and health status and would be fixed for a lifetime. Premiums might range from 52 euros for 
20-year-old new entrants, for example, to 66 euros for those aged 45 and older. If the rate 
exceeds a certain percentage (own contribution rate) of household income, the state will assist 
with subsidies paid from taxes. The employer’s current contribution would be paid as gross 
taxable earnings. Bearing in mind that the transition phase from the current to the new system 
would impose a burden on paying members, taxpayers would have to pay an equalizing 
amount in compensation (Herzog-Kommission 2003). Opponents of the fixed premium model 
argue that this would violate the solidarity principle in which better off contributors pay more 
to finance social insurance benefits than less well off contributors. There are other models for 
calculating premiums and some are presented in the next section. 
Fully funded system 
This reform option would entail transforming the pay-as-you-go system into a fully-funded 
model. The advantage of a fully-funded system is that it breaks the relationship between 
claimants and contributors because every generation would build its own capital stock from 
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their own lifetime paid contributions. This capital would then be used to pay for the transfers 
which would be paid if care is needed. However, the main problem is that during the 
transition phase older claimants would need to be entitled to transfers from the insurance 
scheme despite not having built up a capital stock (protection of confidence). On the other 
hand, the younger generation must build up a capital stock to finance their future needs and 
will not therefore be able to contribute to the pay-as-you-go system in the same way as 
before. The question then is how to finance these transitional costs. Several proposals for 
overcoming this problem are presented in the following, although it is important to emphasise 
that all the models propose a switch to fixed premiums. 
During the transition period capital stock could be built up by increasing the contribution rate 
to 3.2 per cent which would still be paid equally by employers and employees. Additionally, 
the income basis for calculating the contributions could be extended to include other sources 
of income, e.g. rental and capital revenues. Increased wage costs could be compensated for by 
abolishing a public holiday or a paid leave day (Herzog Commission 2003). Another proposal 
is to pay the additional costs through taxes. The older generation (70 years and older) who did 
not build up a capital stock would still pay contributions. All others would build up a capital 
stock to finance their future needs. Additionally, the contribution rate for the older generation 
would be increased to about 3.2 per cent. All further costs to finance the LTC transfers of this 
generation could be paid by taxes (Ottnad 2003). A third suggestion proposes protecting the 
confidence of insured people aged 60 and older (in 2005). This group would pay a fixed 
income independent premium of 50 euros per month. Additionally, the younger generation 
would pay an income-related average contribution rate of 0.7 per cent (as a solidarity 
contribution) to finance the additional costs. These contributions would decrease to zero until 
the end of the transition period. Furthermore, the younger generation would pay a monthly 
premium of about 40 euros to build up their own capital stock (Häcker and Raffelhüschen, 
2004). In its 2004/2005 report, the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2004) argues for a switch to a fully-funded model 
referred to as the cohort model (Kohortenmodell). During the transition period cohorts born 
before 1950 would remain in a system on a pay-as-you-go basis. They would continue paying 
their contributions (fixed premiums) and would receive the required benefits when in need of 
care. Contributions would amount to 50 euros at the beginning and would increase by one 
euro every year. Birth cohorts after 1951 would take out fully-funded cohort-specific care 
insurance cover. The premiums would be calculated from the respective benefit provider, 
taking into account the expected expenditures for each cohort. The premium for older cohorts 
would be higher than for younger cohorts. Premiums would be differentiated according to the 
entry age, i.e. depending on the time remaining for capital accumulation. In addition to their 
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cohort-specific premium, younger cohorts would pay an additional allocation amount, called 
an “elderly lump-sum”, to finance the additional costs during the transition period. 
Additionally, if coinsurance cover is provided for children, a so called “children lump-sum” 
would be added to the fixed premiums (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2004). Another suggestion which goes further in this 
direction limits contributions to 50 euros per month. This would be high enough for younger 
generations to build up a capital stock to finance future expenditures for long-term care. For 
older generations this amount would not be sufficient to finance their future needs which 
would mean that their insurance contracts would cover just part of their risks with an residual 
needs being paid by a mix of tax-financed transfers and out-of-pocket payments (Kronberger 
Kreis 2005). 
Pay-as-you-go system linked to a fully funded system 
Another proposal involves combining aspects of the pay-as-you-go and fully-funded systems 
to overcome the ageing population problem - especially that associated with the baby boomer 
generation. From 2010 onwards all citizens would build up a funded care account 
(kapitalgedecktes Pflegekonto). The general wage-related contribution rate would be lowered 
from 1.7 to 1.2 percentage points with the difference of 0.5 percentage points being deposited 
in a personal financial security account (privates Vorsorgekonto). The correlating additional 
savings would be disbursed by the time the insured person reaches retirement age. In return, 
pensioners would pay 2.6 instead of 0.85 per cent of their pensions to the LTC insurance 
scheme. Implementing the propositions might ensure financing for about 35 years based on 
both the compensation payments of the older and the provisional contributions of the younger 
generations, at the same time maintaining the premium rate at 1.7 per cent (Rürup 
Commission 2003). 
Private insurance 
The change from social long-term care insurance to private long-term care insurance (private 
Pflegeversicherung) is often demanded in context with a fully-funded system (Ottnad 2003, 
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2004, Häcker 
and Raffelhüschen 2004, Kronberger Kreis 2005). Private LTC insurance would be 
compulsory for everyone. An obligation to contract would be imposed on the private 
insurance funds. To maintain the standards of the actual long-term care insurance the benefit 
package and the limited-cover character could be maintained and would be the same for all 
insurance funds (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung 2004). Another suggestion is to provide a compulsory contract with basic 
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securities. This would mean that everyone would be able to opt to conclude additional 
contracts on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, contributions in this reform option would be risk 
equivalent, i.e. higher contributions would be calculated for people whose potential need of 
care is higher (Kronberger Kreis 2005).7 
A private insurance contribution system might be designed as follows. Everyone would be 
insured in the private LTC insurance scheme from birth. During the first 54 years of life fixed 
premiums to finance the LTC risk for this life period within a pay-as-you-go system would be 
paid. The premiums would therefore be relatively low during this period. At the age of 55 
contributions would be re-calculated to enable a share premium account to be built which 
would guarantee sufficient transfers when the person is in need of care. Additionally, the 
share premium account could be built up prior to the age of 55 on a voluntary basis. Families 
and low-income earners would receive tax paid transfers to finance the premiums (Ottnad 
2003).8     
Citizens Insurance 
Introducing the citizens insurance (Bürgerversicherung) means expanding the circle of 
insured persons to comprise all citizens, including civil servants, and self-employed persons. 
Additionally, adjusting the contribution ceiling, e.g. from 3,526 euros (contribution ceiling in 
2004) to the earnings ceiling of the pension insurance (5,100 euros in 2004) would be an 
option to expand the income basis (Lauterbach 2004). Furthermore, an extended income basis 
with additional sources such as rental and capital revenues should be introduced in this 
context (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen 2006, 
Lauterbach 2005). However, it would only be possible to stabilise the premium rate if 
expanding the group of insured persons, widening the income basis and increasing the 
assessment threshold led to significant additional receipts. What is more, the people who 
would be added to the community of insured people should be significantly younger 
(Verjüngung) as including another person subgroup into the social insurance would of course 
lead to an increase in the number of people entitled to receive benefits. 
 
 
                                                 
7 If parents insure their unborn children, contributions will be the same for all children because the possibility to 
assess future needs of care is low. When a person changes the insurance fund during her life, premiums will be 
calculated again and this could lead to differences between insured according to the health status. 
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Integration of long-term care into health insurance 
Separating the compulsory health insurance, which is partially competitive-oriented, from the 
social LTC insurance, which is non-competitive, might lead to disadvantages for the insured 
and create immense problems in cooperation between the different schemes. Problems occur 
with the shift of costs from one class of insurance to another and the ambiguous competencies 
which result. Therefore, an integration of the long-term care insurance into the health care 
insurance is demanded (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Entwicklung im 
Gesundheitswesen 2006). 
4.3 Outcome side options 
Individual Budget 
Individual budgets are fairly modern and popular development. The Netherlands and the 
USA, for example, have already tried out and implemented individual budgets in the care 
sector (Foster et al., 2003, Tilly and Wiener 2001, Evers et al. 1992). In Germany, an 
individual budget scheme is offered in the care for disabled persons. Individual budgets are 
introduced in order to reduce long-term care costs by encouraging more people to choose 
cheaper home care. Furthermore, the quality of life and satisfaction of the frail elderly as well 
as their families is improved as the budget system stimulates competition between care 
providers. Additionally, self-determination and the sovereignty of the frail elderly is 
promoted. In 2004, the implementation of a social experiment for matching transfers (the 
German form of individual budgets) and new housing schemes in order to exploit the 
rationalisation potential by making care benefits more flexible was introduced by the German 
Parliament.  
German matching transfers (personengebundenes Pflegebudget) provide a specific cash 
benefit equal in value to that of in-kind transfers which can be used for the purchase of 
appropriate care services. As it even allows for the purchase of services from providers who 
not concluded a supply contract with insurance funds, it can be seen as an addition to existing 
forms of lump-sum transfers, in-kind transfers, and combined transfers. Providers must be 
lawful and may not be a family member or illicit workers. This means that the person 
receiving a matching transfer is not bound to predefined services but may individually make 
up his or her own service arrangements. Advice and support is given by a case manager who 
assists in the allocation of services and the conclusion of contracts. Anyone who has been 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Premiums would be fixed for the rest of the person's life with the exception of possible adjustments to secure 
real money. 
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examined and allocated to one of the three care levels may apply for a matching transfer 
(Arntz and Spermann 2004). A social experiment is currently being undertaken by the social 
long-term care insurance funds to evaluate the impact of matching transfers (Arntz and 
Spermann 2005).  
Extension of transfers 
As referred to above, no services are included in the current benefit package for the special 
needs of people suffering from dementia. Because the household structure of frail elderly 
people is changing from multi-generation households to single households there is an 
increasing need for these special services. Many long-term care professionals are 
consequently demanding the introduction of special benefits for dementia patients. Their 
objective, for example, is to extend care assistance for dementia patients by about 30 minutes 
per day which would result in many of them being allocated to the next higher care level   
(Lauterbach 2005, Rürup Commission 2003).  
In order to provide more incentives for home care, the transfers for home care and for nursing 
home care should be adjusted. This would be achieved by increasing the rates for home care 
and cutting the rates for nursing home care in care levels I and II. As for care level III, which 
already shows a financial equalisation in both services, the rates should be increased 
accordingly (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen 
2006, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2004, 
Rürup Commission 2003, Lauterbach 2005). Additionally, the benefits provided by the LTC 
insurance scheme should be adjusted regularly (Rürup Commission 2003).  
5 Conclusions 
This paper outlines the German long-term care insurance system and the reform options 
which have been proposed to solve financial problems and to guarantee a sufficient benefit 
package. The social LTC insurance scheme was introduced in 1995 on a pay-as-you-go basis 
with income-related contributions. In the first few years revenues exceeded expenditures. 
Since 1999 the surplus has decreased and will shrink to zero within a few years. An ageing 
population as well as an increase in the prices for long-term care services will exacerbate the 
financial situation of the social LTC insurance. Additionally, the loss of social networks will 
lead to increasing need for professional long-term care services. 
Several reform options have been proposed to overcome this problem, ranging from 
expanding the income basis to abolishing social insurance altogether and introducing private 
insurance with fully-funded financing. Almost all authors suggest a fully-funded system with 
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fixed premiums. The main problem, however, will be the transition from the current to the 
new system: on the one hand the older generation should enjoy protection of confidence and 
thus receive transfers from the current system. The younger generation, on the other hand, 
will have to contribute to the new system in order to build up a sufficient capital stock to 
finance their future expenditures for long-term care. The financing of the costs for the older 
generation is an open issue. Various proposals have been made which mainly differentiate in 
terms of the size of the burden placed on the older and younger generations. However, since 
the social LTC insurance scheme is a relatively young insurance system, the transition period 
is foreseeable and thus the cost gap could be financed.   
Based on the benefit package and the benefit receipts granted by the LTC insurance the main 
proposal is to implement matching transfers which would guarantee more flexibility in 
purchasing care services. A social experiment designed to evaluate the impact of these 
transfers is currently underway. Additionally, demands are also being raised for an annual 
adjustment of benefit receipts in line with current retail price trends and an extension of the 
benefit package to include more services for patients with dementia. Obviously, there are 
many suggestions about how to reform the social long-term care insurance in order to prepare 
it for future needs and challenges. It is the task of current policies to put some of these 
suggestions into action.  
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